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dents of due process88 and equal protection."1 In Jolicoeur, the Supreme
Court of California held that both the twenty-sixth amendment and Cali-
fornia law require that local registrars treat all citizens eighteen years of
age or older alike for all purposes related to voting."5 The registrars were
specifically forbidden from specially questioning the validity of an
affiant's claim of domicile because of his age or occupational status. 9
Thus, the Whatley decision is one of a continuing line of cases recog-
nizing that the student is fully deserving of equal protection of the laws
with regard to his voting rights. "The fundamental importance of the
franchise, as both a symbol and a vital tool of our democracy, requires
that every effort be made to apply uniform standards and procedures to
all qualified voters equally."
40
JAMES S. BIAMNICK
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT FINDS FAULT WITH NO-FAULT
Plaintiff brought an action in the Dade County Circuit Court al-
leging that defendant should be held liable for damages to her car, even
though Florida's no-fault insurance law exempted defendant from tort
liability.1 Plaintiff, whose car had been involved in a collision with defen-
dant's car, alleged that the driver of defendant's car had been negligent
and had been formally charged with failure to yield the right of way.
The recoverable damages were limited to $250, the fair market value of
the car.2 The circuit court dismissed the action on the ground that
Florida's no-fault insurance law, Florida Statutes section 627.738
(1971), exempted defendant from tort liability. This statute provides that
an owner who has elected not to purchase property damage insurance
may maintain an action in tort only if such damage exceeds $550. On
appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, held, reversed and remanded:
Florida Statutes, section 627.738 (1971) is void since it is repugnant
tiffs need only show that a burden has been placed on this precious right in order to avail
themselves of the equal protection clause. Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 684, 189
N.W.2d 423, 429 (1971).
36. Id. at 678, 189 N.W.2d at 426-27.
37. Id. at 694, 189 N.W.2d at 434.
38. Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565, 582, 488 P.2d 1, 12, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697, 708
(1971).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 582, 488 P.2d at 11, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
1. FLA. STAT. § 627.738 (1971).
2. Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1973). Damages were alleged to be $750, but
the fair market value of the car was only $250. The court noted that plaintiff's damages
were limited to the fair market value of the car, since repair costs could not be recovered
when they exceeded the fair market value of the automobile before the collision. 25 C.J.S.
Damages § 82 (1966); 15 D. BLAsrmIEI, AuToroBmu LAw § 480.1 (3d ed. 1969).
CASES NOTED
to article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution, which provides that
"[t]he courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury
.." Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
While no-fault insurance was designed to alleviate inequities inherent
in the fault-based automobile reparations system, the adoption of no-
fault insurance laws by the various state legislatures has raised serious
questions concerning their constitutionality. Kluger is the first case to
challenge the constitutionality of Florida's no-fault insurance law,'
making Florida the third state to have such a challenge made. Both the
Illinois4 and Massachusetts5 laws have faced similar attacks, and of the
three, only the Massachusetts law has survived in its entirety.
The basic premise behind the no-fault insurance Concept is that
the victim of an automobile accident is compensated by his own insurer
for injuries to himself and/or his property, without regard to who was
at fault in causing the accident. Traditional tort liability is thereby
abolished for the party at fault.'
It was because of the severe inequities of the fault-based automobile
reparation system that the no-fault concept emerged. Critics regard the
fault-based insurance system as incomplete and insufficient in compen-
sating the accident victim. Of all automobile accident victims treated
through emergency medical services, fifty-eight percent never recover
in a tort lawsuit either because they are unable to prove fault or freedom
from contributory negligence, or because the defendant was insolvent, or
because only one car was involved.'
Critics contend that the fault-based system is also unnecessarily
expensive to the insuring public for several reasons. First, legal costs are
high because of the necessity to litigate each claim and the difficulty
encountered-in this litigation due to the dual criteria for compensation-
case by case determination of fault, and assessment of damages without
specific guidelines. Second, since the processing of each claim involves
fixed administrative costs, the vast number of small claims filed channels
a large percentage of the premium dollar into clerical processing rather
than compensation of the accident victim.9 In addition, insurance com-
panies often settle small claims for more than they are worth to avoid the
expense of litigation, thus making the system wastefully expensive. 10
Critics of fault-based insurance also argue that this system burdens
3. FLA. STAT. §J 627.730-.741 (1971).
4. Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
5. Pinnick v. Cleary, - Mass. -, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971).
6. See W. Roxs, No-FAULT INSURANCE 3-7 (1971).
7. See Keeton, The Case for No-Fault, 44 Miss. L.J. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
No-Fault].
8. Magnuson, Nationwide No-Fault, 44 Miss. L.J. 132, 137-38 (1973).
9. No-Fault, supra note 7, at 4.
10. R. KEETON & J. O'CoNLL, BAsc PRoTEcTON oR T= Tu c VICTIM 2 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as KmEEoN].
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the community by causing congestion in the courts.'1 The increased taxes
the public must pay to provide a courtroom, a jury, and the necessary
personnel to try a case in which the traffic victim often receives less than
$1000 above his lawyer's fees, is unnecessarily burdensome.
12
While opponents of no-fault insurance do not deny the deficiencies
of the fault-based reparation system, they are concerned that the adoption
of a no-fault plan might well result in the abrogation of traditional con-
stitutional guarantees. The attack against the constitutionality of the
no-fault insurance laws has generally taken three approaches:'3 (1) denial
of equal protection of the laws; (2) denial of trial by jury; and (3) viola-
tion of a provision in most state constitutions that every person shall have
access to the courts for redress of injury.
14
Kluger did not challenge the constitutionality of Florida's entire
no-fault insurance law,' 5 but limited its attack to Florida Statutes, sec-
tion 627.738 (1971), which deals with property damage.' 6 This section
provides, in effect, that the traditional right of action in tort for property
damage arising from an automobile accident is abolished, and compensa-
tion for property damage is only available from one's own insurer, unless
the plaintiff is one who: (1) has chosen not to purchase property damage
insurance, and (2) has suffered property damage in excess of $5 5 0 .17
The plaintiff in this case raised all three constitutional objections to
this provision of Florida's no-fault law,i8 but the court found it necessary
to examine only one of his contentions.' 9 Plaintiff contended that by
abolishing his right to sue in tort, the no-fault insurance law conflicted
with article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution, which provides that
"[t]he courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury,
and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."
20
This provision of the constitution had previously been used to
attack the constitutionality of statutes abolishing pre-existing common
11. Id. at 13.
12. No-Fault, supra note 7, at 10.
13. See, KEETON, supra note 10, at 483-504; DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, AuTomo-
iLE AND INSURANCE COMPENSATION STUDY: CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 3N AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION RE~oiu. (1970).
14. This approach often takes the form of a due process argument. Regardless of which
form the argument takes, however, the considerations raised are generally the same. See,
KEETON, supra note 10, at 489-90.
15. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-.741 (1971).
16. The remainder of the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act requires every
owner or registrant of a motor vehicle in the state of Florida to acquire personal injury
protection benefits. This provides coverage up to a maximum of $5000 for the accident
victim's medical expenses, lost earnings resulting from a disability, and funeral expenses. The
person at fault in the accident is exempted from tort liability unless medical and related
expenses exceed $1000 or the injury consists of a permanent disfigurement, serious fracture,
loss of a body member, permanent loss of a body function, permanent injury within reason-
able medical probability, or death. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-.741 (1971).
17. 281 So. 2d at 3 (1973).
18. Brief for Appellant at 2, Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
19. 281 So. 2d at 3.
20. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
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law remedies,21 but the court had never before established guidelines to
determine its applicability to specific situations. The court was reluctant
to prevent the legislature from ever abolishing any pre-existing remedy
through this provision, for this would impose upon the legislature con-
straints too severe to allow it to keep pace with the continually changing
requirements of society. It could not, however, allow whimsical destruction
of a cause of action which has traditionally existed in the law of the
jurisdiction.22
The court in Kluger, therefore, promulgated the following test for
determining whether a pre-existing remedy can be abolished:
[W]here a right of access to the courts for redress for a particu-
lar injury has been provided by statutory law predating the
adoption of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the
State of Florida, or where such right has become a part of the
common law of the State pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 2.01, F.S.A.,
the Legislature is without power to abolish such a right without
providing a reasonable alternative to protect the rights of the
people of the State to redress for injuries, unless the Legislature
can show an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment
of such right, and no alternative method of meeting such public
necessity can be shown.'
The court then examined those situations in the past where the
legislature has abolished common law remedies, to determine whether
this rule had been violated. In McMillan v. Nelson,24 the Florida Guest
Statute withstood attack under a similar provision of the Florida Con-
stitution of 1885.28 The court noted, however, that this statute did not
abolish the right to sue, but merely "changed the degree of negligence
necessary for a passenger in an automobile to maintain a tort action
against the driver" from ordinary negligence to gross negligence. 7
The court then considered the workmen's compensation statutes,28
which abolished the right to sue one's employer for a job-related injury.2 9
Since workmen's compensation has been held valid under the United States
21. E.g., McMillan v. Nelson, 149 Fla. 334, 5 So. 2d 867 (1942) (attacking the consti-
tutionality of the Florida Guest Statute); Rotwein v. Gersten, 160 Fla. 736, 36 So. 2d 419
(1948) (attacking the constitutionality of the Florida statute eliminating a cause of action
for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction or breach of contract to marry) ;
cf., Spafford v. Brevard County, 92 Fla. 617, 110 So. 451 (1926) (attacking the constitu-
tionality of a Florida statute which vested authority in the State Road Department to con-
demn property).
22. 281 So. 2d at 4.
23. Id.
24. 149 Fla. 334, 5 So. 2d 867 (1942).
25. Law of May 20, 1937, ch. 18033, [1937] Fla. Laws (repealed 1972).
26. FLA. CONST. Declaration of Rights § 4 (1885).
27. 281 So. 2d at 4.
28. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.01-.98 (1971).
29. 281 So. 2d at 4.
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Constitution, 0 it has often been compared to no-fault insurance laws to
justify their constitutionality."' In lieu of a tort action, workmen's
compensation requires that all employers obtain insurance for their
employees to provide compensation for injuries which occur on the job.
The court, however, differentiated between the two laws. In Florida's
no-fault insurance law, the injured party has not been required to cover
himself by insurance, and is thus left without remedy if his right to sue
is abolished. In the workmen's compensation law, since an employer must
provide insurance for his employee, the employee is thereby "provided
adequate, sufficient, and even preferable safeguards" if the need for
compensation arises.8
2
An "overwhelming public necessity" was considered to have been
established when, in 1945, the Florida Legislature abolished the common
law remedies for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduc-
tion or breach of contract to marry."8 In Rotwein v. Gersten,84 in which
the constitutionality of this act was challenged, the court stated that
while these common law actions served a good purpose at one time, "when
they become an instrument of extortion and blackmail, the legislature
has the power... to abolish them."3
In enacting the no-fault insurance law, the legislature did not provide
a reasonable alternative to protect the rights of the accident victim who,
like Kluger, did not purchase property damage insurance and who in-
curred damages below $550. Nor was an "overpowering public necessity"
for the abolishment of the common law right to sue in tort shown by the
legislature when it enacted this law."
The decision in Kluger was not only the first constitutional test of
Florida's no-fault insurance law, but it was also the first definitive judicial
expression of the application of article I, section 21 of the Florida Con-
stitution to laws enacted by the Florida legislature. Although the con-
stitutionality of the remainder of Florida's no-fault law has yet to be
tested under this section,3I it differs in one important aspect from the
property damage portion of the law. A reasonable alternative to suing
in tort is provided for all accident victims in the personal injury section
since insurance coverage is mandatory, thus the court strongly intimated
that this portion of the law is constitutional under article I, section 21:
Had the Legislature chosen to require that appellant be insured
30. New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
31. Pinnick v. Cleary, - Mass. -, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971); see KEETON, supra note 10,
at 485-87.
32. 281 So. 2d at 4.
33. FLA. STAT. § 771.01 (1971).
34. 160 Fla. 736, 36 So. 2d 419 (1948).
35. Id. at 739, 36 So. 2d at 421.
36. 281 So. 2d at 4.
37. The remainder of Florida's no-fault insurance law, FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-.741 (1971),
has been upheld as constitutional in Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 37 Fla. Supp. 178
(Ct. Rec., Broward County 1972).
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against property damage loss-as is, in effect, required by Fla.
Stat. § 627.733, F.S.A., with respect to other possible damages-
the issues would be different. A reasonable alternative to an
action in tort would have been provided .... 8
The remaining portion of Florida's no-fault insurance law still may have
to withstand the equal protection of law and trial by jury arguments, but
similar laws in other jurisdictions have withstood these arguments. 9
Nineteen states have now adopted no-fault insurance programs in
one form or another, and the question of whether no-fault plans should
be adopted is pending in many state legislatures.4" The Kluger decision
is an indication that in spite of the recognized virtues of no-fault in-
surance, the courts will not allow traditional constitutional guarantees
to be abrogated. States which are now in the process of enacting no-fault
laws should consider the guidelines established by Kluger in drafting
their no-fault legislation to help avoid nullification by the courts.
BRUCE S. GOLDSTEIN
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE: JUSTICE IN FLORIDA FOR
THE CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT PLAINTIFF
Following the death of her husband in a truck-car collision, plain-
tiff brought actions for wrongful death alleging that defendant Phillip
F. Hoffman had been negligent in operating a truck owned by a defen-
dant Pay-A-Way Corporation.1 The defendants' answers pleaded gen-
eral denials and the defense of contributory negligence. The plaintiff's
request for jury instructions based upon comparative negligence was
denied by the trial judge and a jury verdict in favor of the defendants
resulted. The plaintiff appealed to the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, which, in an unprecedented decision, reversed the judgment
of the trial court and ordered a new trial in accordance with its opinion
rejecting the rule of contributory negligence and adopting the principle
of comparative negligence.2 The Supreme Court of Florida on conflict
38. 281 So. 2d at 5.
39. Pinnick v. Cleary, - Mass. -, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of Massachusetts' no-fault insurance law); contra, Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d
478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972) (striking down Illinois' no-fault insurance law as unconstitu-
tional).
40. Busnmss WEEK, June 9, 1973, at 33.
1. Jones v. Hoffman, 272 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). The plaintiff maintained one
action in her individual capacity as widow, and the second as administratrix of the dece-
dent's estate.
2. Id. The holding of the district court was unprecedented in that it attempted to over-
rule precedent established by the Supreme Court of Florida 87 years earlier in Louisville
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